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Abstract: This article begins to undertake a human rights analysis of the increas-
ing number of migrants who die annually while trying to cross the borders of
Europe in an irregular manner. Over the past 20 years, border policies increas-
ingly focus on (pro-active, extraterritorial, privatized, and securitized) border
management instead of on classical (reactive, territorial, and public) border
control. On the basis of existing data, it seems plausible to assume that the
increasing migrant mortality is an unintended side-effect of this shift from
control to management. The article argues that it is possible to collect data,
which are more reliable than those presently available, and presents data from a
pilot project carried out on Sicily in November 2011. Presuming better data can
be collected; two diverging human rights approaches are developed – a conven-
tional approach holding that European states are not accountable under human
rights law for these side-effects and a functional approach holding that human
rights law does impose obligations on European states in this context. On all
four doctrinal issues which are relevant to the problem (jurisdiction, positive
obligations, standing, and collective state responsibility), these diverging
approaches lead to diverging doctrinal positions. A choice between the two
approaches implies not only legal but also moral, ethical, and political choices.
*Corresponding author: Thomas Spijkerboer, Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam, The Netherlands,
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Introduction
Two decades ago, up to 250 migrants per year were registered as having died
while trying to cross the borders of Europe in an irregular manner. They were
shot by border guards, had stepped on mines, or had drowned in rivers or at sea.
Today, the annual number of registered border deaths is between 1,500 and
2,000.
This increase in registered border deaths has taken place in the context of
(and, in my hypothesis, is related to) a fundamental shift in European border
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policies. Border policies do not aim at rejecting unwanted individuals at the
physical border, but at influencing behavior of potential migrants in countries of
origin or transit by European policies. This shift from border control to border
management, which forms the context of this article, is described in section
“Historical Perspective”. In this article, I rely on the hypothesis that not only
more migrants but also an increasing percentage of migrants is dying en route to
Europe. In section “Empirical Perspective”, I present empirical material that
makes this a plausible hypothesis. Furthermore, I enquire whether it is possible
to collect better data. This is important, because the empirical data presently
available are problematic, and better data are necessary in order to analyze
border deaths in human rights terms. After examining these two preliminary
issues, I address (in section “Legal Perspective”) the human rights issue that
forms the core of this article: Are European states liable for the loss of life of
migrants at sea?
Two academic studies have mapped the related issue of the human rights
consequences of the externalization of asylum policies.1 In its 2012, Hirsi Jamaa
judgment about the Italian pushbacks of Somalian and Sudanese migrants to
Libya, the European Court of Human Rights has confirmed their findings that if
state agents act outside the territory of the state, they remain responsible under
human rights law.2 It was important, but not surprising that this was estab-
lished, because human rights law has never been inclined to accept that manip-
ulating territoriality allows state agents to do abroad what they are not allowed
to do at home.3 Border policies pose a challenge that is even more problematic
than the externalization of asylum policies. The state agents making and imple-
menting border policies are active predominantly on European territories, but
the effects I focus on here are mostly indirect: They affect migrant behavior not
by turning them back at the border, but by inducing them to use other itiner-
aries. If – the prima facie plausibility of this will be argued below – these effects
result in a considerable increase in migrant mortality, is human rights law
applicable as a set of norms that can govern their acts? Or are border control
policies successful in slipping out from under the aegis of human rights law? If
1 THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, ACCESS TO ASYLUM: INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND THE GLOBALISATION OF
MIGRATION CONTROL (2011); MAARTEN DEN HEIJER, EUROPE AND EXTRATERRITORIAL ASYLUM (2011).
2 Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy (App. No 27765/09) 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), see especially
paras. 70-82.
3 U.N Comm’n on Human Rights, Burgos v Uruguay, Communication No. R.12/52, U.N. Doc.
Supp. No. 40 (A/36/40), at 176 (1981); U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights, Casariego v. Uruguay,
Communication No. 56/1979, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/OP/1, at 92 (1984).
214 T. Spijkerboer
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated | 173.9.48.25
Download Date | 12/24/13 3:59 PM
states succeed in spatially splitting state acts from the effects of these acts; and
if the acts occur on the territory while the effects occur extraterritorially, are they
exempt from human rights responsibility? These issues are beyond the issues
that were examined in existing academic studies and available case law.
Therefore, it is necessary to subject them to a separate analysis.
A note on terminology: The phenomenon I am looking at is people who die
while trying to enter Europe. This may happen at sea by dehydration or drown-
ing, by suffocation in trucks, or they may freeze to death while waiting for a
possibility to cross the border. I am not looking at people who died in their
country of origin, as a consequence of war or persecution, and who would not
have died had they had the chance to migrate to Europe. My research concerns
people who have died while they were actually trying to do so. Furthermore, I do
not distinguish between migrants on the basis of the reason they had for
migrating. This is not only for methodological reasons (the people themselves
have died, hence they are not around to ask) but also because their reasons for
migrating are irrelevant in answering the question of whether European states
may be liable for the unintended side-effect of their border policies, which
purportedly is increased migrant mortality.
Historical Perspective
Since World War II, European states have created modern bureaucratic systems
to manage immigration: They introduced new legislation, established a system
of residence permits and entry visa, distinguished between admission (border
control) and residence (permits), created links between residence and access to
the labor market and social security, set up asylum procedures, and allowed
immigration to be subject to judicial review. When this happened in the late
1950s and 1960s, the aim was to regulate labor migration. This enormous effort,
which took place in all northwestern European states between 1950 and 1980,
despite regional and national particularities, did not necessarily have the
desired effect of controlling migration and migrants. However, it did create a
specialized bureaucracy, with the personnel, the conceptual framework, and the
legal tools that make migration control into a plausible enterprise. These poli-
cies allowed European states to deal bureaucratically with their migrant labor
force. When labor migration policies were put to a halt in the mid-1970s, the
system was adapted, but did not need to be changed to manage family and
asylum migration that became dominant after the end of formal labor immigra-
tion policies.
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With the fall of the Iron Curtain in approximately 1990, long distance air
traffic increased dramatically, and European integration expanded (i.e. the 1992
Maastricht Treaty4), and the policies developed during the post-War era were
subject to a dual shift. First, migration policy was scaled up from the national to
the European level (1985 and 1990 Schengen Agreements; Third Pillar of the
EU5). This was initiated by civil servants more than by immigration ministers
and was intended partly to make migration policies more effective by bundling
them, somewhat by the notion of sidestepping control systems that were pre-
dominantly national such as parliament and the judiciary.6 In the same move,
migration policy became increasingly pro-active: Instead of just administrating
migrants who had already turned up at European airports or aliens police
stations, the aim was to prevent unwanted migrants from departing on their
way to Europe. Migration policies were linked to visa policies: Countries of
origin from which less desired migrants originated were made subject to visa
obligations, culminating in the common European visa system (the European
Visa Code: Regulation 810/20097). Carriers (airlines and shipping companies)
were made responsible for checking the passports and visa of passengers before
boarding. European liaison officers at foreign airports “advise” airline personnel
as to the documentation of passengers. European priorities were set, and in 2004
Frontex, the specialized EU agency for guarding the European coastline was
created (Regulation 2007/2004, amended by Regulation 1168/2011).8 Border
control is securitized, with hi-tech equipment such as sophisticated radar sys-
tems at sea and carbon dioxide sensors in lorries.
4 Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191/1).
5 1985 and 1990 Schengen Agreements; see 2000 O.J. L. 239 O.J. (L 239); Third Pillar of the EU
was introduced with the Treaty of Maastricht (Consolidated version, Aug. 31, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C
224) and was eventually abandoned on Dec. 1, 2009 upon the entry into force of the Treaty of
Lisbon (infra note 10).
6 See on these developments, HUUB MEIJERS ET AL., DEMOCRACY, MIGRANTS AND POLICE IN THE EUROPEAN
UNION: THE 1996 IGC AND BEYOND (1997); Virginie Guiraudon, European Integration and Migration
Policy: Vertical Policy-Making as Venue Shopping, 38 J. COMMON MARKET STUD. 251 (2000); THE
EMERGENCE OF A EUROPEAN IMMIGRATION POLICY (Philippe De Bruycker ed., 2003).
7 Council Regulation 810/09/EC on the European Visa Code, 2009 O.J. (L. 243).
8 Council Regulation 2007/2004/EC Establishing a European Agency for the Management of
Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union,
2004 O.J.(L. 349/1),amended by Regulation 1168/2011, Council Regulation 1168/201/EC amend-
ing Council Regulation (EC) No 2007/2004 establishing a European Agency for the Management
of Operational Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union,
2011 O.J. (L. 304/1).
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Migration policies, of which most instruments had already existed under the
earlier system, fundamentally changed in character.9 Where they had been
reactive and national, they increasingly became pro-active and European.
Parliamentary control lagged behind; it was not until the Lisbon Treaty (2007)10
that the European Parliament acquired its proper role in European migration and
asylum policy, as did the Court of Justice. In the 15 years between the Maastricht
Treaty, which inaugurated embryonic European competences in migration policy,
and the Lisbon Treaty, the externalization of European migration policies had
taken place. The legacy of the 15-year democratic and judicial gap left a legal
gap: that is, to what extent are European states legally accountable for the
external effects of migration policies? The effects of migration policies used to
occur on their territories were seen by the public, and thus, sensitive to public
opinion, and supervised by parliament and the judiciary. They now take place in
part outside European territories, public opinion needs mediators such as NGOs
and humanitarian organizations for information, while parliaments and the
judiciary – even if provided with sufficient reliable information – hesitate
whether these effects are within the scope of their competence and authority.
Part of this change was an innovation in border policies. Until a few decades
ago, border controls took place at borders. Migrants were either admitted or
refused entry at ports, airports, or land-border crossings. The problems and
expenses of removal, especially in ports and airports, led European states to
shift border control to places beyond their borders. Carrier sanctions (in the form
of fines for airlines transporting undocumented migrants) are an example and
are sometimes combined with agents of European states advising airlines about
the genuineness of travel documents at check-in counters. The consequence of
carrier sanctions is that migrants shift their travel routes to land and sea. This is
especially problematic, as the sea routes are inherently more dangerous than air
travel. Another example of border control policies is the subsequent intensifica-
tion of control at sea, with the aim of blocking short and relatively safe routes,
such as the Strait of Gibraltar and the Adriatic Sea between Albania and
Southern Italy. Migrants then choose ever longer and riskier routes.
The increasing number of migrant deaths has taken place in the context of a
fundamental shift in European policies. Initially, states engaged in border con-
trol, which took place at the border, which concerned the individuals who turned
9 I refer here to what Sassen calls “capabilities” which “jump tracks.” The conceptual frame-
work used here is based on SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS: FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL
ASSEMBLAGES (2006).
10 Treaty of Lisbon Amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty Establishing the
European Communities, Dec. 13, 2007, 2007 O.J. (C 306) 1.
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up at their border, and which was reactive in that it waited until a person turned
up at the border. Over the years, we have witnessed a development toward
border management. Border management takes place at the European level and
aims at effects beyond the border (in countries of origin or transit). It seeks to
influence the behavior of migrant populations, and it is pro-active by aiming at
prevention of irregular departure.
Empirical Perspective
If we want to analyze whether European states may be accountable for border
deaths, we will have to rely on presumptions as to how many migrants died
when and where as only problematic data are available. The most comprehen-
sive, Europe-wide set of data is the list of fatalities of United, an international
NGO based in Amsterdam.11 This list is based on press reports. In one way, these
data are over-inclusive, because they also include people who, for example,
committed suicide while residing in an alien detention center in Europe. With
that, their number is low. A later data set, which is comparable in methodology
and shows comparable trend, is the one of Fortress Europe.12 Local, short-term
studies13 lead to higher numbers than the ones by United and Fortress Europe
but for smaller areas (Spain and Sicily, respectively), and for short periods. Kiza
has summarized the data available, using the United data as a starting point.14
His methodology is more sophisticated than the one of United/Fortress Europe,
as he has (a) excluded people who did not die on their way to Europe but, for
example, committed suicide in European detention centers and (b) complemen-
ted the United data with other media sources. Despite this more refined meth-
odology, he comes up with a development of the number of fatalities that is very
similar to the incorrect number. A bigger source of concern is the reliability of
11 www.unitedagainstracism.org.
12 www.fortresseurope.blogspot.com.
13 Dirk Godenau & Vicente Manuel Zapata Hernández, The Case of the Canary Islands (Spain):
A Region of Transit Between Africa and Europe, in IMMIGRATION FLOWS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF THE
EU’S SOUTHERN MARITIME BORDERS 13 (Gemma Pinyol ed., 2008), available at www.cidob.org/en/
content/.../8449/.../doc_migraciones_17.pdf; Jorgen Carling, Migration Control and Migrant
Fatalities at the Spanish-African Borders, 41 (2) INT’L MIG. REV. 316 (2007) and Paolo Cuttitta, Il
controllo dell’immigrazione tra Nordafrica e Italia, reprinted in LIBRO BIANCO, I CENTRI DI PERMANENZA
TEMPORANEA E ASSISTENZA IN ITALIA UN’INDAGINE PROMOSSA DAL GRUPPO DI LAVORO SUI CPTA IN ITALIA 169
(Nicoletta Dentico e Maurizio Gressi eds., Rome, 2006).
14 ERNESTO KIZA, TÖDLICHE GRENZEN – DIE FATALEN AUSWIRKUNGEN EUROPÄISCHER ZUWANDERUNGSPOLITIK
(2008).
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press reporting. Press attention for border deaths may not reflect the actual
number of border deaths. No sources address the issue of dark numbers; the
articles of Cuttitta and Carling15 suggest that these are considerable.
In this text, I present the United data, problematic as they are, for two
reasons. First, Kiza’s more precise data reflect a trend that is very much like that
present in United’s data. Second, the United data are available as an Excel file,
and as a consequence take less time to work with than the Fortress Europe data.
In addition, Kiza’s data only concern the period 1994–2004.
Figure 1 illustrates that the number of almost 2,000 fatalities for 2011, while
dramatic does merely constitute a further development of the upward trend we
see in the figure. The dip in 2010 is improbable and is more likely to reflect the
unreliability of the data rather than an actual drop in migrant deaths.
For the feasibility of a human rights analysis of migrant deaths, it is important to
know whether data of better quality can be collected. If not, then a human rights
analysis will have to rely on empirical presumptions that, even when they are
plausible, make the analysis vulnerable. In order to assess whether a human
rights analysis with a solid empirical basis is at all possible, I have undertaken a
pilot project.
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Figure 1: Migrant fatalities in the EU Migratory System (1993–2011)
Source: United 2012.
15 See supra note 13.
Moving Migrants, States, and Rights 219
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated | 173.9.48.25
Download Date | 12/24/13 3:59 PM
Triangulation: An Exploratory Project on Southern Sicily
In November 2011, I have checked the registry of deaths in two municipalities in
southern Sicily (Statu Civile of Pazzallo and Porto Empedocle), with a double
aim. First, I wanted to find out whether these local death registries are accessible
for research purposes. Second, I wanted to find out whether consulting these
registries (which should contain entries for all bodies found in Italian waters or
on Italian shores) would add information.
Figure 2 summarizes the data on deaths that were registered in the Statu
Civile of Pazzallo and Porto Empedocle for the period 1993–2010. I have com-
pared these data to those from United16 and Fortress Europe,17 as well as to the
list published by the Special Commissioner for Disappeared Persons of the
Italian Home Office.18 The full comparative data are given in the Annex to this
article.
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Figure 2: Migrant fatalities registered in Pazallo, Porto Empedocle 1998–2010, according to four
sources
16 http://www.unitedagainstracism.org/pdfs/listofdeaths.pdf.
17 http://fortresseurope.blogspot.com/2006/01/press-review.html.
18 http://www.interno.it/mininterno/export/sites/default/it/assets/files/20/
0404_REGISTRO_CNI_al_31122010.pdf.
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These data show that, indeed, data based on local civil registries are more
reliable than those of United and Fortress Europe. They suggest that the data of
the Italian Ministry of the Interior are more inclusive than those of the local civil
registries. However, whereas United has entered 6.821 migrant deaths between
1993 and 12 May 2012, the Italian Ministry of the Interior lists only 778 deaths for
the period 1969–2010, while these data predominantly concern the homeless not
migrants.19
Yet another source is the registries of the public prosecutor of the district
court. As the corpses of the migrants are corpus delicti, the public prosecutor
must permit their burial. These data – at the provincial level – are available at
an aggregate level as opposed to that of the communities. Presently, I am trying
to get these data from the public prosecutor in the province of Agrigento, in
which both Pazallo and Porto Empedocle are located.
One more source – the registries of local cemeteries – could be added. I
found these to be very hard to access. In addition, bodies are not necessarily
buried in the same locality where their death has been entered in the statu civile,
so it might be difficult to determine which grave corresponds to which entry in
the statu civile.
The aim of this exploratory project was twofold. First, I wanted to use
triangulation: Look at the same phenomenon using different sources. Second,
I wanted to explore which source was most reliable and whether using the most
reliable source added much information. On the basis of this, I conclude that
indeed all dead persons are entered in local death registries. The same data should
be available at provincial level from the public prosecutor’s office; as noted, I am
still working on getting these. When we compare the sources, we see that the statu
civile and the Ministry of the Interior are both relatively complete and that relying
on their information indeed adds to the information of United and Fortress
Europe. Because of the unreliability of the Interior Ministry’s data for the entire
period (see above), the statu civile seems to be the most reliable source. However,
relying on the NGO data would have given much the same picture, because the
trends in the NGO data are the same as those in the statu civile and Ministry of the
Interior data. Because the exploratory research was limited to two municipalities,
these conclusions cannot be generalized without further investigations.
On the basis of this exploratory project, it seems plausible to concur that
this research method (consulting local death registries) can lead to a compre-
hensive data set on the number of deaths, the approximate time of death, and
the place where the bodies were found. This method could be used along the
19 I conclude this from the place where the migrants were found, which is mostly on the Italian
mainland, far from the shore or the border.
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Mediterranean coast. Even so, it is clear that there are various problems with this
method: (a) some people wash up at the coast on the southern and eastern side
of the Mediterranean or of the Atlantic, and (b) some bodies will never be found.
On the first issue: there are no reasons to believe that the number of bodies that
wash up on the shore of departure develops differently from that of people
which wash up at European shores. Here, the problem is to estimate the dark
number, but this dark number will probably not influence the pattern (increase,
decrease) shown by the data from European death registries. For the second
issue, this is different. As travel routes become longer (in order to evade
intensified controls at short and safe routes), as the boats used become of
lower quality (the likelihood that they will be confiscated increases), and as
trips are more frequently made under bad weather conditions (lower visibility),
it is more likely that people die at sea far from the shore, and that their bodies
are never found. Therefore, presumably that dark number increases in relation
to the number of known deaths. This is a problem (because it makes it harder to
estimate the fatalities). However, the number of known deaths rises steadily;
and the relative number of unknown deaths rises as well. As these trends run
parallel, the problem does not make it impossible to analyze the developments
in the number of border deaths, as long as there are convincing reasons to
assume that the (unknown) dark number is rising.
At this moment in time, conclusions about the empirical aspects of border
deaths must be tentative. The data presently available show a tenfold increase in
the absolute number of migrant deaths over the past 20 years. It seems unlikely
that the absolute number of irregular migrants has increased by a factor ten as
well. Therefore, the hypothesis that not only the absolute but also the relative
number of border deaths has increased is plausible. On the basis of the devel-
opment of European border policies over the past 20 years, in combination with
the available data on border deaths during the same period, the remainder of
this article will proceed on the basis of the hypothesis that the shift from border
control to border management has been accompanied by an increase of migrant
mortality. It is duly noted that, at present, this is hypothesis, but the pilot project
described above has shown that this hypothesis can be put to the test by means
of further empirical research.
Legal Perspective
The question which this article raises for investigation is whether the hypothe-
sized relationship between European border control policies of the past two
decades on the one hand, and the rising number of border deaths leads to a
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(moral and) legal obligation of European states to address the rising number of
border deaths on the other hand. I focus on the right to life, which arguably has
been violated vis-à-vis the deceased migrants, although one might look at other
rights (most notably the rights of survivors, who suffered during the trip that
their fellow migrants did not survive, and who for protracted periods afterward
may suffer from survivors’ trauma). However, addressing the position of survi-
vors would complicate my argument, without shedding new light on the crucial
issues, and, therefore, I refrain from looking at their position.
On border deaths, two approaches are conceivable. The first, conventional
one, would be to emphasize that these deaths occur indirectly (i.e. state agents
are not killing migrants, but policies arguably have as a side-effect that irregular
migration becomes more dangerous) and often outside the territory of European
states. This lack of direct state involvement and of a direct link with the territory
stands in the way of state accountability for migrant deaths. The second,
innovative one, would emphasize that the increased number of deaths is a
consequence of changes in state policies. As these policies side step human
rights norms,20 human rights law has to adapt so as not to become obsolete. I
refer to this innovative approach as functional.21
I develop a conventional approach and a functional approach on the four
issues that are relevant in our context. The first is jurisdiction. The migrants
mostly were not under direct control of European State authorities when they
drowned, and often, they were not in their territorial waters either. This raises the
issue of whether they were within the jurisdiction of European state. The second
issue concerns positive obligations. It seems unlikely that the problem of border
deaths is most fruitfully conceived of as one involving a negative obligation.
European States could abolish border controls in order to reduce the number of
border deaths. However, as the legitimacy of border controls has consistently been
underlined by, among others, the European Court of Human Rights,22 one can
hardly expect them to stop a practice that in itself is lawful. But it does make
sense to enquire what states could do in order to limit this lethal side-effect of
their border control policies – and that means we have to face the issue of positive
20 REBECCA ADLER-NISSEN & THOMAS GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, SOVEREIGNTY GAMES: INSTRUMENTALIZING STATE
SOVEREIGNTY IN EUROPE AND BEYOND 17-24 (2008).
21 I take the term from Yuval Shany’s article. See Yuval Shany, Taking Universality Seriously:
A Functional Approach to Extraterritoriality in Human Rights Law, 7 (1) L. & ETHICS HUM. RTS.
(2013).
22 The standard passage states that, as a matter of well-established international law, have the
rights to control the entry of non-nationals into its territory. See, i.e., Abdulaziz, Cabales and
Balkandali v. The United Kingdom (App. Nos. 9214/80, 9473/81, 9474/81) 94 Eur. Ct. H.R.
(Ser. A) (1985).
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obligations. Third, I examine standing: who can represent the interests of
deceased migrants, and of prospective migrants whose chances of surviving
arguably are influenced by the policies of European states? Last, I address the
problem of collective state responsibility. Because the intensification of border
controls at the southern maritime borders is a joint undertaking of European
states, the issue is one of joint responsibilities.
I address these issues primarily by referencing the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR) – the human rights convention with the closest geogra-
phical relation with the issue under consideration. Also, the competent court
[the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR)] can give binding judgments and
has developed a rich case law relevant in our context.
Jurisdiction
In the context of border deaths, can states be held responsible for acts which
either occur outside their territory (including their territorial waters), or the
effects (i.e. migrant deaths) of which occur outside its territory? In terms of the
ECHR, this translates into the issue of whether the alleged victim of the state
action is within the jurisdiction of the state.
For our purposes, three situations have to be distinguished:
– State acts take place within the territory of the state (including its territorial
waters), and effects of those acts take place within the territorial waters of
that same state;
– State acts take place within the territory of the state (including its territorial
waters), and effects of those acts take place outside the territorial waters of
that same state;
– State acts take place on thehigh seas, or in the territorial waters of other states in
clearings expropriations.
The first situation is entirely unproblematic for both the conventional and the
functional approaches. Both the state act and its effects take place within the
jurisdiction of the state in question. Of course, this does not mean that a
violation of some convention right occurred, as jurisdiction does not imply
that there is a sufficient causal relation between state act and effect, and it
remains to be seen whether the effect entails a violation of a convention right at
all. But whatever difficult issues remain, jurisdiction is not one of them. This is
comparable to the responsibility of East German leaders for the shooting of
migrants at the Iron Curtain.23
23 Streletz v. Germany (App. Nos. 34044/96, 35532/97, 44801/98) 2001-II Eur. Ct. H.R.
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The second situation seems altogether different. The person affected by the
state act is outside its territory. In the case law of the ECtHR, two streams can be
distinguished: One, which fits with the conventional approach, is exemplified by
Banković, in which the Court held that jurisdiction is primarily a territorial
concept and gaps in human rights’ protection do not imply that the
Convention is to be applied throughout the world.24 Banković indeed stands in
the way of reasoning that seeks to hold state accountable for any consequence
of its acts, wherever in the world they occur. However, three aspects in parti-
cular distinguish the facts of Banković from those in border death cases. First, in
Banković, the applicants relied on the notion that a situation can be in the
jurisdiction of two (or, because of the NATO aspect of the case, even more)
state at the same time. This issue of competing jurisdictions is not at stake here,
because border deaths will usually occur on the high seas or in the territorial
waters of European states. Second, the state acts, which arguably lead to the
effects outside the territorial waters of the state (being border policies and their
implementation), are undeniably acts that take place predominantly within the
jurisdiction of the state. That is different from a situation in which airplanes
carry out bombardments outside the territory of the relevant Member State.
Third, present day border policies are designed in part with the specific aim of
escaping from state responsibility. One of the attractions of carrier sanctions and
interception is that in this way states seek, often successfully, to evade the effect
of the prohibition of refoulement. The gap in human rights’ protection that exists
if one denies jurisdiction in these cases is a gap created by the shift from control
to management.
Another, functional approach is conceivable. One may point to X and Y v.
Switzerland, in which the Commission held that state responsibility can be
engaged by acts of its authorities producing effects outside its own territory.25
A German national was prohibited entry into Liechtenstein on the basis of a
Swiss decision applying the Swiss aliens law. An international agreement
between Liechtenstein (not a party to the ECHR) and Switzerland (which is a
party to the ECHR) essentially made Swiss aliens law applicable in
Liechtenstein, which had no aliens law of its own. The Commission considered
that it was the Swiss authorities that had acted, although with effect on the
territory of Liechtenstein. Therefore, Switzerland was held responsible for the
effect that the prohibition of entry produced in Liechtenstein.
24 Banković et al. v. Belgium (App. No. 52207/99) and 16 other Contracting States, 2001–XII
Eur. Ct. H.R. 333. (GC). See Kees Wouters, International Legal Standards for the Protection from
Refoulement 211-16 and the sources quoted there (2009) (examining Banković extensively).
25 X. and Y. v. Switzerland, 9 Eur. Comm’n. H.R. Dec. & Rep. 57 (1977).
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The conventional approach would deny state responsibility, because the
event occurred outside the state’s territory, without direct and active involve-
ment of a state agent. The state was not in control of the situation in any way.
The functional approach would hold that in this specific context (i.e. externali-
zation of border policies), it would be artificial to argue that the victim is within
the jurisdiction of the state if a boat capsizes within the territorial waters of a
state, while the person is presumed not to be within the jurisdiction of that state
if the same boat capsizes just beyond the territorial waters of that State. In both
situations, the argument (whether one accepts that argument is another ques-
tion) is that people drown as a consequence of the way in which border policies
are carried out; they are – so the argument goes – directly affected by those
policies, regardless of whether the victims are within or beyond the territorial
waters of the state. Furthermore, the functionalists could point out that the
Court’s position on the relevance of territoriality is quite unclear.26 In standard
case law, the Court holds that acts performed or producing effects outside (author
emphasis) their territories can constitute jurisdiction.27
The third situation is, once more, unproblematic in both the conventional and
the functional approaches. The Court dealt with it in Xhavara.28 This decision
concerned a boat with undocumented migrants which was struck, at 35 sea miles
from the Italian coast (i.e. outside its territorial waters), by an Italian marine vessel
and sunk as a consequence. The Court nowhere objects that the victims were not
in the jurisdiction of Italy. In this case, the entire situation took place outside the
territorial waters of Italy, and therefore has less ties with Italian territory than the
second situation, being extraterritorial effects of acts carried out mainly within the
territory of a state. It is remarkable that in the Xhavara case, with strong parallels
to Bankovic (extraterritorial acts with extraterritorial effects) the Court did not even
consider the jurisdiction issue, apparently finding the situation obvious.29 The
26 I.a. the dissenting opinion of Bonello in Al-Skeini and Others v. The United Kingdom (App.
No. 55721/07) 53 Eur. Ct. H.R. 18 (2011) (GC), where he proposes to “return to the drawing board”
on this issue.
27 Hirsi Jamaa v. Italy, supra note 2, para. 72.
28 Xhavara et quinze autres v. l’Italie, Appl. No. 39473/98. Eur. Ct. H.R. See on this Rick
Lawson, Life after Bankovic, in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES 83, 99-100
(Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004).
29 Echoing the Court in Banković, O’Boyle objects that in Xhavara no jurisdiction objected was
recorded, suggesting that the Court might have found jurisdiction problematic if it had, Michale
O’Boyle, Comment on “Life after Banković,” reprinted in EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS TREATIES 125, 134 (Fons Coomans & Menno T. Kamminga eds., 2004). However, he ignores
that no objection from either Italy or Albania is recorded at all in Xhavara, which deprives this
argument of its validity.
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Court’s position in Xhavara is consistent with cases that are quite similar to the
interception situation, concerning acts of functionaries of embassies abroad30 and
was confirmed in Hirsi Jamaa discussing interception on the high seas of migrants
by Italian coast guard and navy vessels.31
In conclusion, the first situation (border deaths occurring within the terri-
torial waters of a State) is clearly within the jurisdiction of that State. The third
situation (interception on the High Seas – Xhavara, Hirsi Jamaa) also is clearly
within the jurisdiction of the intercepting state. The second situation is less
clear. One may apply the Banković, line and deny jurisdiction. One may also
argue that it would be odd to find this case not within the jurisdiction of the
State, while the third is; therefore – in the functionalist view – the conclusion
should be that the situation indeed is within the jurisdiction of the relevant
State.32 A conventional approach would contrarily argue that there is nothing
odd in distinguishing between, on the one hand jurisdiction on the territory and
jurisdiction by state officials acting outside the territory and, on the other hand,
state acts on the territory having effects outside the territory without state agents
being active outside the territory as well.
Positive Obligations
If one accepts that State accountability is not excluded on grounds of jurisdic-
tion, a next issue is how European states could be argued to violate human
rights of migrants who drown at sea. One could imagine two versions of an
argument critical of the present situation. In its most radical form, the argument
that border deaths constitute an actual violation of Convention rights would not
require the doctrine of positive obligations. This argument would hold that state
acts (i.e. border policies) lead to border deaths; hence, these acts (i.e. border
30 X v. Federal Republic of Germany, App. No 1611/62, 62 Eur. Comm’n. H.R. Dec. Rep. (1965);
M. v. Denmark, App. No 17392/90, 90 Eur. Comm’n. H.R. Dec. Rep. (1992). Recently, Al-Skeini
and Others v. The United Kingdom, see supra note 26. The U.S. Supreme Court held otherwise for
the Refugee Convention, see Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993). Apart from the
fact that this judgment did not concern the ECHR, it has been strongly criticized, see, i.e., GUY S.
GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 246-250 (2007); JEAN-YVES CARLIER,
DROIT D’ASILE ET DES RÉFUGIÉS. DE LA PROTECTION AUX DROITS 106-10 (2008); JAMES C. HATHAWAY, THE RIGHTS
OF REFUGEES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 335-42 (2005).
31 See Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, supra note 2, para. 81.
32 See for a comparably broad notion of jurisdiction Elihu Lauterpacht & Daniel Betlehem, The
Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion (2003), reprinted in REFUGEE
PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 87, 110-11 (Erika Feller, Volker Türk, & Frances Nicholson eds.,
2003).
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policies as such) violate Convention rights. The consequence of this argument
would be that border policies as such constitutes a violation of the Convention,
hence the practice of policing borders should be stopped. Obviously, this posi-
tion is hard to sustain in light of the Court’s unwavering case law holding that,
subject to their treaty obligations, states have the right to control the entry of
aliens.33 Whereas a critique of the Court’s position may be appropriate, I do not
undertake such a critique here and take the Court’s position as a given. I do,
therefore, not investigate whether migrant deaths infringe on a negative obliga-
tion of states.
However, if one relies instead on the doctrine of positive obligations, one
can develop a human rights analysis of border deaths while at the same time not
denying States’ right to control the entry of aliens. A conventional approach
would hold that the border deaths, even accepting that in a statistical sense they
may be related to European border control policies, are too remotely connected
to these policies. These policies are one of the factors among many others that
play a role. But apart from these policies, various other factors and actors play a
role. Decisions taken by smugglers and migrants are relevant; the weather plays
an important role, as does the reliability of the vessels used. A conventional
approach would emphasize that the main decision (i.e. to migrate without the
documentation required) was taken by the migrant, hence the main responsi-
bilities for the risks involved in that choice are the migrant’s.
The functional argument would admit that, under the International Law
Commission Rules on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts,34 States are not responsible for the fatalities resulting indirectly from
border policies because border control in itself is not a wrongful act. Under
some circumstances, however, states may be responsible for damage arising out
of acts not prohibited by international law. This may be the case if a State
undertakes a hazardous activity, defined by the International Law Commission
as “an activity which involves a risk of causing significant harm.”35 This is
precisely the case at hand. An indication that, indeed, obligations toward
undocumented migrants do exist can be found in Article 16 paragraph 1 of the
2000 Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea And Air,
Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
33 The Court has held so since its foundational judgments Abdualaziz Balkandali and Cabales v.
The United Kingdom, supra note 22 and Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A)
(1989). It repeated this in our particular context in the Xhavara decision, supra note 24.
34 See the Annex to G.A. Res 56/83, U.N. Doc. A./RES/56/83 (Dec. 12, 2001).
35 International Law Commission. Res. U.N. Doc A/CN.4/L.686 (May. 26, 2006).
228 T. Spijkerboer
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated | 173.9.48.25
Download Date | 12/24/13 3:59 PM
Crime,36 which stipulates that states shall take “all appropriate measures,
including legislation if necessary, to preserve and protect the rights of persons
who have been the object of [smuggling] as accorded under applicable interna-
tional law, in particular the right to life.” In light of the definition of smuggling
in Article 3(a) of the Protocol, this provision is applicable in this context. Further
indications of a positive obligation to prevent the loss of life at sea can be found
in international maritime law.37
The European Court of Human Rights has developed a position on the
obligation of States to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction.38 In
Osman, the central issue was whether the authorities had protected the life of a
man and his son from attack by a stalker.39 In Keenan, the issue was whether the
United Kingdom had protected the life of a suicidal man.40 In Öneryildiz, the
Court dealt with an explosion at a waste-collection site in Istanbul, in which
nine people were killed.41 Three issues are central to this line of case law. Firstly,
it must be decided whether the authorities knew or should have known that
there was a real and immediate risk for the life of an individual. The second
issue is whether the authorities took all necessary measures that could reason-
ably be expected to prevent the risk from materializing. And, third, if the risk has
materialized, the state must respond adequately, in particular by conducting an
official investigation.
As to the first issue (were the authorities aware of the risk, or should they
have been), the Court formulated an individualized criterion in Osman. It held
that it has to be established whether the authorities knew or ought to have
known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an
identified individual or individuals. The Court does not accept the position of the
36 Adopted by G.A. Res. A/RES/55/25 (Nov. 15, 2000) at the fifty-fifth session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/479dee062.
html.
37 For example, Article 98 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Nov. 16, 1994, 1833 U.
N.T.S. 397; Article 12 of the Convention on the High Seas, Sep. 30, 1962, 450 U.N.T.S. 397; The
International Convention on Salvage, 1989 U.N.T.S. 194; International Convention for the Safety
of Life at Sea, 1974, 1184 U.N.T.S. 3, especially arts. 7 and 33; International Convention on
Maritime Search and Rescue, 1979, 1405 U.N.T.S.; see generally PATRICIA MALLIA, MIGRANT
SMUGGLING BY SEA: COMBATING A CURRENT THREAT TO MARITIME SECURITY THROUGH THE CREATION OF A
COOPERATIVE FRAMEWORK (2009).
38 See extensively PIETER VAN DIJK ET AL., THEORY AND PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN
RIGHTS 355 (4th ed. 2006); D. J. HARRIS, M. O’BOYLE, COLIN WARBRICK, & ED BATES, LAW OF THE EUROPEAN
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 42-46 (2d. 2009).
39 Osman v. The United Kingdom, 1998-VIII, No. 95 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1998).
40 Keenan v. The United Kingdom, 2001-III Eur. Ct. H.R.
41 Öneryildiz v. Turkey, 2004-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC).
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United Kingdom, which argued that the failure to perceive the risk must be
tantamount to gross negligence or willful disregard of the duty to protect life.42
Comparably, in Keenan it examined whether the authorities knew or ought to
have known that Mark Keenan posed a real and immediate risk of suicide.43 A
conventional approach would emphasize the concrete and individual nature of
the risk. In Öneryildiz, however, the Court did not repeat the requirement that the
authorities should have been aware of the risk to a particular individual. The
context is a different one than the situation dealt with in Osman and Keenan.
Referring to the particular context of dangerous activities (in that case: waste
collection), the Court placed special emphasis on regulations geared to the
special features of the activity in question, particularly with regard to the level
of the potential risk to human lives.44 When it addresses the particular circum-
stances of the case, it states that there was practical information available to the
effect that the inhabitants of certain slum areas of Ümraniye were faced with a
threat to their physical integrity on account of the technical shortcomings of the
municipal rubbish tip.45 It then concluded that the Turkish authorities knew, or
ought to have known, at several levels that there was a real and immediate risk
to a number of persons living near the Ümraniye municipal rubbish tip. They
consequently had a positive obligation under Article 2 of the Convention to take
such preventive operational measures as were necessary and sufficient to pro-
tect those individuals.46 It is important to note that the Court has accepted a
positive obligation in this situation, where a group of people living in an
identifiable area was at risk, without being clearly identified as a number of
particular individuals. A second important thing to note is that the Court has
accepted that there can be a positive obligation in respect to a risk that does not
emanate from a particular person. In Öneryildiz, the risk was the consequence of
a combination of human activity (waste collection) and natural processes (the
formation of methane gas). Where the risk to life arises from inherently danger-
ous, but basically lawful, activity, such as military tests, the operation of a
factory involving toxic emissions, or of a large waste disposal site, the state
has a duty to provide an effective system of regulation, supervision, and control,
providing for identification and correction of any dangerous shortcomings.47 In
42 Osman, supra note 39, para. 16.
43 Keenan, supra note 40, para. 93.
44 Öneryildiz, supra note 41, para. 90.
45 Id. para. 98.
46 Id. para. 101.
47 CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 64 (4th ed., 2006),
references omitted.
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addition, the State may owe positive obligations to the public at large, as when a
State operates a system of leave or relaxed custody for prisoners at the end of
their term. The State then owes a duty of care to members of the public in
respect of any risk to their lives that may be reasonably anticipated.48
In the context of border policies, functionalists could argue that the group of
potential victims is sufficiently identifiable – that is, those who will set off from
the coasts of North and West Africa, and Asia Minor, trying to reach Europe.
Admittedly, this group is more fluid than the group of people living close to the
Istanbul rubbish dump. However, the Istanbul group was not constant either
(people were born and died, moved in and out of the area, came for visits, left
during parts of the day for work, or other reasons). European border policies
increase risks for a clear category of people, being that of people in particular
geographical areas who remain there (often for a protracted period of time) with
the aim of sailing to Europe. That this is a large category cannot be an argument
against a positive obligation; it makes a possible infringement more serious, and
not the other way around. The counter-argument would hold that the Istanbul
group had a clear core (the inhabitants at any given moment), whereas the
group of potential migrants is inherently fluid.
As to the second question (whether all necessary measures were taken to
ward off the risk), the Court has time and again emphasized that the positive
obligation to protect life must be interpreted in a way which does not impose an
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. Accordingly, not every
claimed risk to life can entail for the authorities a Convention requirement to
take operational measures to prevent that risk from “materializing.” The Court
rejects the position that the failure to take preventive measures to avoid that risk
must be tantamount to gross negligence or willful disregard of the duty to
protect life. A conventional approach would emphasize this: States actively try
to combat the phenomenon migrants are dying of (irregular migration), hence
they do what they can reasonably be expected to do in order to save migrants’
lives. However – a functionalist approach would reply – the criterion applied by
the Court (did the authorities do all that could be reasonably expected of them to
avoid a real and immediate risk to life49) leads to a case-by-case approach.50 In
Öneryildiz, in order to assess what the authorities were obliged to undertake, the
48 Mastromatteo v. Italy (App. No. 37703/97) 2002-VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC); see supra note 34,
Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, & Bates, supra note 38, at 46.
49 For slightly different formulations, see Keenan, supra note 40, para. 90: did the authorities
fail “to take measures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have
been expected to avoid that risk.”
50 See Osman, supra note 39, para. 116.
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Court finds it relevant that the authorities themselves had set up the site and
authorized its operation, which gave rise to the risk in question.51 Also, the
Turkish government argued that the victims of the methane explosion had
knowingly chosen to break the law and live in the vicinity of the rubbish tip.52
The Court rejected this argument, holding that the authorities had consistently
tolerated slums in the vicinity of the refuse dump and could not maintain that
any negligence or lack of foresight should be attributed to the victims; it also
found relevant that the Turkish authorities had remained passive in face of the
unlawful dwellings.
It is relevant that the argument which seems to be most forceful in rejecting
a positive obligation in the border death context (namely, migrants themselves
take these risks so States cannot be held responsible if they materialize) is
rejected by the Öneryildiz Court in terms that may be directly applied in the
border control context. One would expect the Court to find the fact that migrants
knowingly choose to break immigration law and seek to cross border evading
border control points not decisive. European states themselves have set up these
particular border policies, which give rise to the risk in question. That is, in fact,
the core of the argument for accepting a positive obligation: States should
incorporate into their policies a serious effort to minimize unintended side-
effects, in particular if these side-effects consist in the foreseeable death of
hundreds, if not thousands, of people each year. The conventional argument
against a positive obligation can rely on one aspect in which the border control
context differs radically from the Öneryildiz case. One cannot maintain that
European states tolerate or have remained passive in the face of undocumented
migration. Obviously, one could argue that European states engage in combat-
ing undocumented migration in the full knowledge that they will fail and that
their policies increase the risks; but undeniably, it is hard to directly rely on
Öneryildiz on this point.
The third issue concerns how the authorities should respond if the risk has
materialized. The adequate response the Court has dealt with (most extensively
in Öneryildiz) is focused on investigations in order to establish criminal respon-
sibility of third parties or government officials, or to allow for civil, adminis-
trative, or disciplinary remedies for the victims.53 In the border control context,
however, the allegation would not be that individual government agents have
carried out border controls in an inappropriate way; if that were the complaint,
51 Öneryildiz, supra note 41, para. 101.
52 Id. para. 103.
53 See Öneryildiz, supra note 41, paras. 91-92.
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the framework the Court has been developing so far would be appropriate.
However, the allegation in the border context is that policies have been designed
(as opposed to execute) without appropriate consideration of the risks
they entail. In this context, the very general starting point of the Court is all
there is:
Where lives have been lost in circumstances potentially engaging the responsibility of the
State, that provision entails a duty for the State to ensure, by all means at its disposal, an
adequate response – judicial or otherwise – so that the legislative and administrative
framework set up to protect the right to life is properly implemented and any breaches of
that right are repressed and punished.54
The Court took a comparable position in Menson, where the United Kingdom
was not responsible for the death of Michael Menson (who was set on fire by
four white youths), but nevertheless was under an obligation to institute an
official investigation.55
In the context of border control, an obligation to instigate an investigation
into the behavior of State officials will sometimes be relevant. This happened in
the Xhavara case. It is obvious that such investigation should be undertaken
when a migrant vessel has been sunk, as in the Xhavara case, or when migrants
have been shot or have stepped on land mines at the Turkish/Greek border.56
But the issue at stake here is a more difficult one. If migrants simply drown, or
54 Id. para. 91.
55 Menson and Others v. The United Kingdom (App. No. 47916/99), 2003-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 826.
56 This happens with some regularity. According to press reports quoted by United, migrants
were shot on March 29, 1995 (Greece), August 20, 1995 (France), September 5, 1996 (Spain),
August 17, 1998 (Italy), May 10, 2000 (Turkey, 9 persons), November 15, 2000 (Turkey),
December 3, 2000 (Spain), July 16, 2001 (Turkey), January 12, 2002 (Turkey), 2 persons, March
2002 (Macedonia, 7 persons), May 22, 2002 (Turkey), June 19, 2002 (Turkey, 2 persons),
September 23, 2003 (Greece), October 3, 2003 (Spain), April 11, 2004 (Spain), April 17, 2004
(Slovakia, 2 persons), September 10, 2005 (Greece), September 19, 2005(Turkey), September 19,
2005 (Morocco, 5 persons). Migrants died in the minefields at the border between Turkey and
Greece on September 13, 1995 (4 persons), June 30, 1996 (2 persons), September 15, 1997 (3
persons), April 16, 1998 (2 persons), August 26, 1999 (3 persons), October 31, 1999 (5 persons),
May 1, 2000, August 29, 2000, September 1, 2000 (2 persons), March 29, 2001 (2 persons), May
21, 2001, May 22, 2001 (2 persons), September 30, 2001, December 23, 2001 (4 persons), March
20, 2002 (2 persons), March 27, 2002, August 28, 2002, January 4, 2003 (2 persons), March 2003,
September 29, 2003 (7 persons), August 5, 2004, November 14, 2004 (3 persons), April 4, 2005 (2
persons), May 29, 2005 (2 persons), December 9, 2005 (2 persons), May 30, 2006 (1 person), July
3, 2006 (3 persons), July 25, 2006 (2 persons), September 10, 2006 (2 persons), December 3, 2006
(Morocco, 1 person), August 1, 2007 (Morocco, 2 persons), November 8, 2007 (Greece,1 person),
November 16, 2007 (Cyprus, 1 person), January 1, 2009 (1 person). See http://www.unitedagain-
stracism.org/pdfs/listofdeaths.pdf.
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die in other ways but not through an activity of a State official directed at them
personally, what would the required adequate response consist of?
A conventional approach would hold that situations in which there have
been acts of state agents directed against the purported victims (as in Xhavara),
or situations where there was evidence of a criminal offence (as in Menson), are
not to be put on an equal footing with a situation where there is no criminal
offense against the life of the victim, no direct state action, and the issue at stake
is an abstract policy. There can be no obligation to investigate and, depending
on the outcome of such an investigation, to adapt border control policy. One
may find this desirable from an ethical point of view, but in the conventional
approach it cannot be a legal obligation.
A functionalist approach would hold that there are three ways in which
European states should respond. Firstly, border deaths are related to European
border policies. Their number is related to the externalization of border control
and intensification of patrols on relatively safe sea routes. The core of the issue
is whether there is a sufficient relationship between these policies and border
deaths. Certainly the two phenomena are related, but whether the relation is
sufficiently close is another matter. In order to be able to assess these policies in
light of international law, it is necessary that more detailed and reliable infor-
mation becomes available. The phenomenon of border deaths is of such magni-
tude that it can be argued that States are under an obligation to collect these
data. One may argue that there is an obligation under Article 2 ECHR to monitor
in a consistent way the consequences of these policies. Presently, there are no
reliable data on the number of border deaths. Within an EU context, a shared
approach must be developed for collecting these data from local or maritime
authorities who take care of the corpses. These data should be as specific as
possible about the time and place the bodies were recovered, cause and circum-
stances of death, the identity of the migrant, and the like.
Secondly, one may argue that there is an obligation to subsequently evalu-
ate border control policies regularly in light of the data collected in that way. If a
policy has potentially lethal side-effects, there is an obligation to assess how
these side-effects develop, whether these developments may be related to policy
changes or changes in the context, and whether the unintended side-effects can
be limited by (flanking) policy measures.
Thirdly, one may argue that States have an obligation to the surviving
relatives of the victims. They must try to identify the bodies, using information
about the region of origin of the victim, testimony of surviving fellow migrants,
and if possible finger prints, DNA, and other tools of international policing. As
Stefanie Grant has argued, the “vast arsenal of technology used in border
control (should be diverted) to the humanitarian task of maintaining a register
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of those who die making the journey toward their border; relatives could access
the records at some future time.”57
To sum up: one can conceive of a conventional approach denying the
existence of any positive obligation in the context of migrant deaths. This mainly
relies on the fact that border policies are not the only, and arguably not the main
factor in the climbing number of migrant deaths. A functionalist approach, even
when it does not dispute that, may well argue that border deaths give rise to
three distinct positive obligations, fulfillment of which together comply with
Article 2 ECHR: first, the obligation to carry out an investigation into the number
of fatalities at the European borders over the past decades, and in the future to
collect such data at least annually; second, the obligation to assess European
border control policies in light of these data, in order to develop (flanking)
policies which effectively minimize the number of fatalities; and third, the
obligation to establish the identity of the victims, to inform their relatives, and
to deal with the bodies in accordance with their wishes as far as possible.
Standing
In addition to raising complex issues of jurisdiction and positive obligations,
border deaths are also problematic from the point of actual justiciability,
because victims simply are unable to bring their cases as a consequence of
precisely the behavior which, arguably, violates the Convention. They are dead
and the identity of the great majority of the victims is unknown. Their surviving
kin is unknown, and therefore the theoretical possibility that they litigate58 will
remain theoretical. It may take a class action to bring these issues to court. It is
significant that only one border death case has been brought before the
European Court of Human Rights.59 In that case, Xhavara, the deaths occurred
very close to the country of origin, which increased the likelihood of surviving
kin knowing about it.
The position of the Court is that organizations may address the Court, but
neither individuals nor organizations can bring an actio popularis, or abstract
complaints. It has summed up its position as follows:
57 Stefanie Grant, Recording and Identifying European Frontier Deaths, 13 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L.
135 (2011). Comp. Council of Eur. Com. H.R.: The Human Rights of Irregular Migrants in Europe,
CommDH/IssuePaper (2007)1, Strasbourg, Dec. 17, 2007, Conclusion 3: “It is imperative to begin
a process to identify and account for the thousands of ‘missing’ undocumented migrants, who
disappear – on the journey or after arrival – and whose identities are unknown.”
58 See, e.g., Keenan, supra note 40.
59 See supra note 28.
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The Court reiterates that Article 34 of the Convention requires that an individual applicant
should claim to have been actually affected by the violation he alleges. That Article does
not institute for individuals a kind of actio popularis for the interpretation of the
Convention; it does not permit individuals to complain against a law in abstracto simply
because they feel that it contravenes the Convention. In principle, it does not suffice for an
individual applicant to claim that the mere existence of a law violates his rights under the
Convention; it is necessary that the law should have been applied to his detriment. 60
(Klass and Others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, § 33)
This seems to exclude the possibility of a complaint lodged by NGOs on border
policies.61 Therefore, the conventional approach seems a very comfortable one.
However – a functionalist would retort – it should be noted that the Court’s
concern is that it should not give judgment about potential human rights
violations. It explains its objections to the actio popularis and abstract com-
plaints by emphasizing this, and by outlining the limited number of exceptions.
In order to adjudicate a potential violation, the applicant must produce “reason-
able and convincing evidence of the likelihood that a violation affecting him
personally will occur; mere suspicion or conjecture is insufficient in this
respect.”62 However, in border death cases, the issue is not that the alleged
violations have not yet taken place. Instead, they have taken place, and pre-
cisely because of that European states may well have succeeded in keeping the
purported victims of European border policies effectively outside the scope of
European courts.
In this context, the proper parallel – still according to a functionalist –
would not be that of the objections against the actio popularis, but that of
unrepresented minors. The Court has ruled on a conflict over a minor’s interests
between a natural parent and the person appointed by the authorities to act as
the child’s guardian. It held that the mother’s standing as the natural mother
suffices to afford her the necessary power to apply to the Court on the children’s
behalf, too, in order to protect their interests.63 It ruled likewise in cases con-
cerning persons who lost their legal capacity after being committed to a psy-
chiatric hospital.64 On the basis of this, it may be argued that an NGO can have
60 The Christian Federation of Jehovah Witnesses in France v. France (App. No. 53430/99)
2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. Compare with La Ligue des Musulmans de Suisse (App. No. 66274/09)
given June 28, 2011.
61 Cf. VAN DIJK ET AL., supra note 38, at 483, 55-56; Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, & Bates, supra note
38, at 791-93.
62 See Harris, O’Boyle, Warbrick, & Bates, supra note 38, at 792 and the case law referred to
there.
63 Scozzari v. Italy (-App. No 39221/98 and 41963/98) 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. par. 138 (GC).
64 Winterwerp v. The Netherlands (App. No. 630/173) 33 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) (1979), para. 10.
236 T. Spijkerboer
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated | 173.9.48.25
Download Date | 12/24/13 3:59 PM
standing on behalf of victims who have not addressed the Court, provided that
(1) it is necessary to accept their standing for an effective protection of
Convention rights – in this case because the victims are effectively outside the
scope of European courts; and (2) provided that it has been established that one
or more violations have already taken place, that is, the application does not
concern a potential violation.
Which State?
A last issue concerns joint operations of European states, whether or not under the
banner of Frontex, the EU border agency. Because of the cooperation of European
states in border control, one may well argue that responsibility for border deaths
does not, or not exclusively, lie with Mediterranean states, but with all European
states – it is their joint border that is being guarded even if the actual work is often
done by States such as Spain, Italy, Greece, Malta, and Cyprus.
A conventional approach would hold that it is entirely unclear as a result of
which State actions the migrants are argued to have died. Would it be the State
at which shores the body was found? Or all Mediterranean states? All Schengen
states, because they have a common external border control? Or all EU States,
because Frontex is a European agency? There can be no state responsibility if
the wrongdoer cannot be identified.
In Bankovic, the applicants lodged a complaint against 17 States, being those
NATO Member States which were also parties to the ECHR. The issue there was
whether States are liable for an act carried out by an international organization of
which they are members.65 The difference with border controls is that these are
not carried out by the EU, but by Member States, possibly in joint operations. The
similarity is that the airplanes dropping bombs on Belgrade were not NATO
airplanes, but airplanes of NATO Member States even though they were acting
under NATO command. In any case, the issue was explicitly not decided by the
Court. There seem to be no obstacles to joint responsibility of EU Member States
for the way border controls are carried out, but much will depend on the circum-
stances of the case. However, even if EU States were to transfer competence in the
area of border control to the EU, they would remain responsible for guaranteeing
Convention rights.66 A functionalist would emphasize that the issue has not been
decided by the Court and that the Court has emphasized that cooperation between
65 See Banković, supra note 24, paras. 30 and 83.
66 Matthews v. The United Kingdom (App. No. 24833/94), 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC); See Ovey &
White, supra note 38, at 30.
Moving Migrants, States, and Rights 237
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated | 173.9.48.25
Download Date | 12/24/13 3:59 PM
states cannot be allowed to affect the scope of their responsibilities under inter-
national law. In T. I. v United Kingdom, it held that where States establish
international organizations, or mutatis mutandis international agreements, to
pursue cooperation in certain fields of activities, there may be implications for
the protection of fundamental rights. It would be incompatible with the purpose
and object of the Convention if Contracting States were thereby absolved from
their responsibility under the Convention in relation to the field of activity covered
by such attribution.67 A functionalist approach would hold that relying on the
problem of having to identify the specific state that is responsible for this parti-
cular death is merely a procedural version of seeking absolution from human
rights responsibility via international cooperation.
Conclusions
Do European states have a positive obligation to minimize the rising number of
fatalities (the hypothesis I rely on in that respect was laid out in paragraph 2,
Introduction, which occur in relation to their border policies? An argument that,
indeed, such a positive obligation does exist is possible. It does require accep-
tance of some innovative elements on the points of jurisdiction and positive
obligations. A convincing case can be made that these innovative elements do
nothing but mirror the innovative aspects of European border policies that I
have outlined in paragraph 1, Introduction. A central effect of European border
policies over the past 20 years has been that their consequences occur outside
Europe, before migrants reach Europe, so that they are out of reach of Europe’s
legal systems. If law is to be effective in upholding human rights, it has to keep
pace with policy innovations, the effect of which that the consequences are out
of the reach of human rights law. However, the argument to the contrary is
valid as well. It can be argued that jurisdiction should not be stretched to make
European states responsible for the consequences of their policies outside
their territory, unless State agents themselves act outside the territory. In addi-
tion, it can also be argued that a positive obligation can only exist vis-à-vis
groups of people who are more determinate than migrants are. Finally, one may
argue that States are not responsible for the consequences of what people do
when they seek to contravene policies that are actively enforced by the
authorities.
67 T.I. v. The United Kingdom (App. No. 43844/98) 2000-III Eur. Ct. H.R., referring to Waite and
Kennedy v. Germany (App. No. 26083/94) 1999-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 67.
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As to the procedural issues, the situation is similar. Should standing of
NGOs on behalf of people who cannot act for themselves be accepted? Should
States be held responsible collectively for the effects of joint policies, if a
requirement of individual responsibility would make it impossible, or at least
very difficult, for claimants to effectuate a claim? The argument can be made
that this should be accepted because it is necessary to uphold human rights
protection for a group in dear need of it. But the argument can also be made that
this should not be accepted because it would open the possibilities for litigation
too much and could lead to State responsibility for situations in which it is not
clear whether they are sufficiently involved.
Legal arguments tend to get terribly complicated when they deal with an
issue that is the subject of substantial disagreement. That is what we can
observe here. On the one hand, there is the perception that Europe may be (or
actually is being) beleaguered by alien hordes unless effective border policies
remain in place. The widening gap in affluence between Europe and many other
parts of the world, coupled with increasing international mobility, requires
innovations of border control. From that perspective, externalization at the
European level seems like a good move. On the other hand, there is the percep-
tion that effective protection of human rights – not just the protection of wealth –
is at the core of the European project. Border policies may well be necessary for
protecting this European project. But that makes it all the more crucial that,
precisely in that context, the effective protection of human rights is not diluted.
These issues are not merely legal ones but also involve moral, ethical, and
political choices. In making such choices, legal arguments can play a role. It
would have an effect on European policy making if it were presumed that
European countries are potentially responsible under human rights law for
migrant deaths. Yet, legal arguments do not determine these choices. We are
acutely aware that migrants are on the move. But in response to their moves,
States have made counter-moves; they have redeployed policy instruments that
they already had in innovative ways, making policy effects occur outside their
territory. They have expanded the horizon of their policies and have designed
policies with external effects. How should human rights law respond to the
move of these effects from the territory of European states to outside their
territories? Should it stick to the territorial focus characterizing human rights
law until now? Or should it rely on those threads in case law and doctrine that
allow for a functionalist approach? Until now, the issues dealt with in this article
have mainly been ignored. Europeans prefer to look the other way on the issues
of border deaths. The least we can do is to notice, to register, and to take
account of the human costs – to others – of protecting our European project.
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Only when we have begun to do that can we decide whether a fair balance
between costs and benefits has been struck.
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Annex: Migrant deaths in Pazallo and Porto Empedocle (Sicily)
Date of
death
Statu Civile Number M/f/unknown Place where
found
United? Fortress
Europe?
Commissario
2011?
11-9-1998 Pozallo 1 0 0 1
24-6-1999 Vittoria 1 0 0 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 F Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 F Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 F Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 F Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 F Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
7-3-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M Sea, Pelagia 1 1 1
26-5-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, Ibrahim
Yahya
ABAKER,
Sudan, 1975
Sea,
Lampedusa
0 0 0
(continued )
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(Continued )
Date of
death
Statu Civile Number M/f/unknown Place where
found
United? Fortress
Europe?
Commissario
2011?
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1 27
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
15-9-2002 Porto
Empedocle
1 M, presumably
liberian
Sea, Capo
Rosello
1 1
21-2-2003 1 ? Sea 0 0 1
15-3-2003 1 M Sea 0 0 1
19-3-2003 1 M Sea 0 0 1
(continued )
Moving Migrants, States, and Rights 241
Brought to you by | De Gruyter / TCS
Authenticated | 173.9.48.25
Download Date | 12/24/13 3:59 PM
(Continued )
Date of
death
Statu Civile Number M/f/unknown Place where
found
United? Fortress
Europe?
Commissario
2011?
14-5-2003 Porto
Empedocle
1 ?, black Sea,
lampedusa
? ? 0
15-12-2003 Aacate 1 Contrada
Dirillo-Chiappa
0 0 1
24-3-2005 Pozzallo 1 M Sea, Sicilian
coast
1 1 0
24-3-2005 Pozzallo 1 M Sea, Sicilian
coast
1 1 1
24-3-2005 Pozzallo 1 M Sea, Sicilian
coast
1 1 1
24-3-2005 Pozzallo 1 M Sea, Sicilian
coast
1 1 1
24-3-2005 Pozzallo 1 M Sea, Sicilian
coast
1 1 1
24-3-2005 Pozzallo 1 F Sea, Sicilian
coast
1 1 1
24-3-2005 1 M, oriental During rescue
operation at
sea
0 0 1
8-9-2005 Porto
Empedocle
1 ? Sea, Siciliana
coast
0 ? 2
11-9-2005 Porto
Empedocle
1 ? Sea, Siciliana
coast
0 1 0
22-10-2005 Porto
Empedocle
1 ? Sea,
Lampedusa
0 0 1
24-7-2006 Acate 1 Harbor of Acate 0 0 1
24-7-2006 Acate 1 Harbor of Acate 0 0 1
9-8-2007 1 Joboo Dead
MALIK
Found at sea on
board of
Chelyabinsk
with 26
migrants alive,
brought on
land at Pozallo,
report in
registry
0 0 0
1-9-2007 Pozzallo 1 Sea, Correnti
Isle
0 1 1
Total 55 39 41 57
Sources: Statu Civile Pazallo, Porto Empedocle; United; Fortress Europe; Italian Ministry of the
Interior.
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